



Eric Hobsbawm

‘The future belongs to bigger entities’

In gesprek met Eric Hobsbawm

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In your book you defend a thesis that is popular among students of nationalism by asserting that in your opinion the nation, and therefore nationalism, is a ‘novelty’. I agree that these concepts, in the specific sense in which you use them, are modern. But on the other hand there is a chapter in your book called ‘Popular proto-nationalism’, which suggests nationalism is not a complete novelty after all. What exactly in your opinion is the relationship between this proto-nationalism and nationalism? Is there a fundamental break and difference between them?

I do not think they are fundamentally the same. The essence of nationalism, as it develops from the eighteenth century onwards, is that the idea of a particular people and the idea of the state should coincide, however the people is defined. In the case of what I call ‘proto-nationalism’, and what other people call ‘national consciousness’ or something like that, there is practically never the assumption that this consciousness has anything to do with the actual form of political organization under which people live. The two examples I give in my book, are those of the Jews and the Germans. Among the Jews the consciousness is age-old that they are a people different from all the other people they live among. But that never in fact implied the longing for a particular, special state for Jews. Very possibly because this kind of state was not recognized anywhere during this period. The Germans have lived in various colonies and settlements over large parts of Europe. But to the best of my knowledge until the nineteenth century there has never been a problem which arises from the fact that they lived under rulers who were not Germans or in states that were not identified with Germans.

Does this imply that you do not think, as for example A.D. Smith does, that there are ethnic origins of nations, or at least that you do not regard them as fundamental?¹

There *is* ethnic consciousness, and quite often it is very strong. In my view it is often strongest in those cases where it is directed not against a particular foreign state, but against *any* state. That is for example the case with the Berbers in North Africa, the Pathans in Afghanistan or the Highland Scotsmen and a number of others, of

which the Kurds are the most recent example. I do not believe that until after Versailles the problem of an independent Kurdistan arose, because I do not believe that the Kurds saw themselves as in any way requiring this. The states under which they lived, were not national states in any sense either. So while I am sure that Smith is right that there is a very strong and quite often very ancient sense of ethnic cohesion, I do not believe it has any automatic connection with nationalism. Of course it can be very easily turned in to something like nationalism.

You describe popular proto-nationalism as ‘feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate ... on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations’.² In what sense is this different from ‘ethnic consciousness’?

I think the difference is a big one. Smith concentrates on all types of ethnic consciousness. In my chapter on proto-nationalism I concentrate on such sentiments as may exist before modern nationalism and which could help to make it more easily acceptable and adoptable. I think for example, that the consciousness of being part of a strong empire is certainly among those.

But I suppose that feelings like these only existed among the elite. Was it not your intention to give ‘a view from below’?

I think that the idea that you are part of, let us say, the Roman Empire, is something which undoubtedly can hold together many people who otherwise have little in common. If I understand him correctly Gwyn Williams, an excellent Welsh historian, suggests for instance that the first way in which the Welsh had consciousness against the Anglo-Saxons, was not as Welsh - in fact they did not yet have this name for themselves - but as Romans, as Britons defending the remainders of the Roman Empire against invaders.³ That does not necessarily imply that they identified with the emperor, but at least they realized that they were part of a political system. This is I think very important in the case of Russia, where the proto-nationalism of the Great Russians is certainly not ethnic. Even though it so happens that by modern standards most Russians actually talked Russian with relatively less of dialects than in other cultures.

I suppose that the thesis that the nation is a relatively new and modern concept necessarily implies that nationalism is also a novelty?

The idea that nationalism is something that does not really exist before the

eighteenth century, is accepted quite generally. Of course there are a few anticipations, like the state-nationalism of England, but yes, I do believe that the idea of a state which should express a people and only *one* people, particularly if that is defined ethnically and linguistically, is very recent. I try and argue in my book that in effect this variety of nationalism is even more recent than the concept of nation and nationalism in general. The original concept of the nation, as it was expressed for example during the French Revolution, was *not* ethnic and linguistic.

In this original concept there was an equivalence between state and nation in that sense that all people living in a state automatically belonged to the nation. That brings us to the relationship between state and nation. The point of departure in your book is that nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round.⁴ I suppose you do not want to maintain that states are always prior to nations.

Indeed, there are plenty of examples where this is not the case. But once the idea gets around that in a sense a people should have its own state, you also get the possibility of a national movement to create such a state. Not necessarily a totally sovereign, independent state. I do not believe for example that the Czechs in the nineteenth century really thought in terms of sovereign independence, as they did after 1918. But clearly, the existence of all these nationalist movements assumes the existence of certain types of states to which a nation wishes to aspire.

So the idea 'state' has to exist before the idea 'nationalism' can arise?

I would think so. To this extent I converge with Tilly. It is the state formation which is really a central element in the development of nationalism.

By whom or what is a nation created in case it is *not* created by a state that already exists?

Well, we have of course a variety of examples of national movements, movements to establish at least autonomy. The important element here, it seems to me, is that they should represent what Hroch calls phase C, namely that they should have mass-backing.⁵ This should be distinguished from the kind of thing which you find in say traditional Poland or Hungary, where there was a political nation which, however, consisted exclusively of the ruling class, the gentry and aristocracy. That does not necessarily imply a mass-nationalism. Although once you get a mass-nationalism, it can then reach back to older traditions and use them. In the case of

Ireland for instance, there is no doubt that there existed a very strong political sense of the Irish being different from and hostile to the English. This desire to be against the British could very easily shift over into the programme of separating from Britain and having one's own state. Which I think it did in the course of the French Revolution.

In your book you repeatedly refer to the ideas of Hroch. But does not the way he characterizes nationalism - especially in its so-called first and second phases - collide with Gellner's definition, which you claim to accept. According to Gellner nationalism is the political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.⁶ How can one, accepting this definition, speak of a non-political nationalism?

The point is that ethnic consciousness, and any other consciousness, can *become* political under certain circumstances. Zionism for instance is an attempt to turn the very strong pre-existing consciousness of Jews being Jewish and having a traditional relationship to the Holy Land into a political programme. But of course Zionism as such is a new programme.

But still, can one really call Hroch's nationalism in its first cultural and folkloristic phase 'nationalist'? It has nothing to do with politics.

In its first phase probably not. But nevertheless, it is very important, because it provides the soil out of which a large number of national images, national myths and so on grow. Much of this 'folklore' becomes part of what people begin to see as their own identity.

In your book you emphasize that essentially nations are constructed 'from above'. Not completely - that exactly is what you criticize in Gellner's book - but to a large extent.⁷ What do you mean by 'from above'? Do you want to suggest that the intellectuals, who in my opinion played such an important role in spreading national ideas, were members of the political elite? To me they seem to be a kind of lower-middle class.

I indeed criticize Gellner because he sees the whole process entirely as a function of modernization, a process in which everything is created from above. But I agree with him in so far, that the role from above is enormously important. In a way both the vocabulary and terminology, the whole so to speak tool-kit of the political nation, i.e. the state, is not found in the traditional popular culture and the traditional

popular way of thinking. In most peasant societies for instance there existed the alternatives between the village church and the universe. There was nothing in between. Well the nation, and the state, in the modern sense is precisely something which is in between. It is perfectly easy for a medieval peasant to get used to the idea of an emperor who rules the whole world. On the village level, the parochial level so to say, he knows exactly where he is and what politics is. I agree, in between you have lords, but it is very doubtful exactly where they stand. So the definitions have to be brought in from outside, even though later on people more or less assimilate them. That is what I mean, when I say that the construction from above is very important. When, how soon and how quickly the common people assimilate these ideas, is a very great problem. We do not really know. When the masses become mobilized on nationalist, or on any other mass-politics, they buy a package which contains a lot of different things. They do not simply go around shopping, buying precisely what they want to have. Party leaders or movement leaders come to them, saying for example: 'You should support us, because you are a German'. But the programme or 'package' which they offer, contains a lot of things which would not necessarily be the ones which they would pick, had they been able to shop around for each individual item. And so it is not easy to know what exactly 'the people' think. All one can say, is that they identify with 'a people' or 'a nation', or with 'us' against some specific enemy. But exactly what that implies, or what it would imply, if they did not support a specific party, is not so clear.

You criticize Gellner because he discusses the problem of nation-building exclusively from an elite-perspective. That is the only criticism I find in your book. Does this mean that you agree with his basic thesis, which can be crudely summed up in the statement that nationalism is a necessary component of modernization?

I do not think that this is true in the case of ethnic-linguistic nationalism. He is right in the purely technical sense that modernization does require mass-education and that mass-education requires a mass-vernacular. In that sense there clearly is a relation. But otherwise I do not think so. I think modernization requires a territorial state and to some extent a, what I call, citizen-influencing and citizen-mobilizing state.

Which in itself does not account for the rise of nationalism!

Except that if you do build such a state, the common sentiment, or civic religion if you like, which develops, is something which can be called nationalism. The

extreme case here is the United States, where a consciousness of being American developed, which in fact is a very strong national consciousness. Even though originally the Americans did not like to call their country a nation. They thought a nation was something too centralized. This consciousness has become part of the political dimension of being an American citizen. But in fact it is entirely as it were a function of the American Revolution and the values that this revolution established.

Is it not a paradox, or even a contradiction, to say that nationalism is an effect of modernization, when most national movements were rather - as I suppose you will agree - conservative or at least backward-looking?

If you remember, I try and distinguish really three things. I distinguish the original revolutionary concept of nationalism of the American and especially of course the French Revolution from the later liberal concept, which dominates, I think, most of the nineteenth century. Both these, in turn, must be distinguished from the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century version of nationalism which is fundamentally ethnic-linguistic, and becomes so more and more. The important element in the first is the democratic element, the people-mobilizing element. It sees the state as the representative of 'the people'. How the sovereign people is governed, is another matter.

I think there are more exclusive tendencies in that 'democratic nationalism' than you account for, even in the period of the French Revolution.

Yes, there are more exclusive tendencies. But the nation is not defined ethnically-linguistically. In practice it may well be that the existence of France makes people feel, as I try to show, that for instance French-speaking French citizens are somehow more equal than non French-speaking French citizens. But in theory they are not. In theory they are exactly the same. In the case of the United States in theory there is no merit in speaking English, except that everybody in the United States speaks English and one may assume that if you do not speak English, you will not be a full citizen. In the liberal concept of nationalism the element of a threshold was crucial, that is to say the idea that a nation occupies a particular phase in the historical evolution and that this is a phase in which it is bigger than in earlier phases. Essentially only those nations are justified, which are 'viable' and of course also which want to be nations. So, consequently, a lot of movements, in fact the characteristic national movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, would have been rejected in the nineteenth century by the liberals and, I think, by practically everybody. I quote plenty of examples of people who indeed

rejected them. There is the classical example of Mazzini and Cavour, who say they may have great sympathy with the Irish, but really, they are too small to become an independent nation, they had better stick with the British. Now this would be incomprehensible in twentieth-century nationalism.

I would like to return just one more time to the relationship between modernization and nationalism. What do you think is the relationship between state-building, nation-building and capitalism? Was it by accident that these occurred more or less during the same period?

I am most reluctant to believe that it is by accident. It seems to me that the liberal idea, which is that of having a sufficiently large territory with a sufficiently large resource-base, is essential for the construction of the early industrial economy. In effect the major countries which developed, were medium to large-size states. I think that one foundation for this is that these states have a better scope for development. But whether there is any rational reason why this should be so, is not so clear.

Charles Tilly more or less suggested that the small city-states, the old centres of commercial capitalism, could not survive in modern capitalism where the role of fixed capital is so important. He thinks it would have been very implausible for modern capitalism to develop in the old city-state structure.⁸

That is certainly true. Nevertheless, there are possible exceptions. I would say that the city-state or the small state can establish itself, but only as a function of a very large market within which it occupies a particular strategic position. In the earlier days it was comparatively easy to do this, because you could do so on the basis of specialized trading. What is on Tilly's mind is, that once you have got essentially a basis in production, you need a larger territorial resource-base than the very small units can have at their disposal. How big, I do not know. Pollard in his book on the European industrialization points out quite correctly that if you look at industrialization, the actual frontiers in fact were relatively unimportant.⁹ Industrialization took place in a series of regions within Europe and in his opinion the extent to which these were part of a state, was not very important. I can not say that I have made up my mind about this. I repeat, I would be most reluctant to believe that there is no connection. At least people believed that a sufficiently large national market and a sufficiently large national resource-base were necessary. Whether this meant that these are the nation-state or some other kind of territorial state is another matter. The idea that you have to be bigger was certainly the essence

of the whole liberal thing: history is, in a sense, the process of getting bigger units. Which is a cultural process as well as a political and economic process.

Do you think that is the progressive element in liberal nationalism?

Well, at least in the nineteenth century it was regarded overwhelmingly as a criterion of progress. In fact, in terms of what we have now, which is a fairly functioning world economy, it has become clear that the sheer scale of the units, the building units in this world economy, is not necessarily a positive thing. It may be more effective to decentralize units. But, certainly until the early and mid-twentieth century, the general assumption was 'Big is beautiful', not only economically, but even in terms of production. It is only very recent that people are coming to believe that big is not necessarily beautiful and that big corporations, while maintaining their control at the top, decentralize and become more flexible.

You suggest that nationalism started as a 'democratic' or 'liberal' movement. But were not for instance the German nationalists conservative from the very beginning instead of progressive?

I do not really believe that. In most countries, including Italy and Germany, nationalism and liberalism went together. I think it was a left-wing movement. Conservatives were against it.

But even if this were true, of which I am not convinced, you admit that in any case around 1870 nationalism and liberalism parted their ways. Why did this happen, why did nationalism become conservative?

That is a very crucial problem. There is no question that this has happened, and not only in Germany. The vocabulary for instance in France of nationalism changed. Words like 'patriot', from being previously associated typically with the left, became associated typically with the right.

Could not the political stance of nationalists be related to the fact whether nationalism was a mass-movement or not? Is it not true that whenever it became a mass-movement, it also became a right-wing conservative movement?

I do not think mass-nationalism was conservative, at least not invariably. Although, it is difficult to say because of what I pointed out as the package-deal thing. There is no question for instance that the Irish national movement in the nineteenth and

twentieth century was on the left wing of British politics. Its alliances were with liberals, radicals and the others. And I think this is the same with the early nationalist movement in tsarist Russia. The Georgian nationalist movement were the Mensheviks and they were a mass-movement. So, I do not think you can say that these mass-movements are invariably right-wing.

But in most cases they are?

Where they compete against non-nationalist movements, they certainly tend to be, because of the very fact that their major competition is against the labour movement and the socialist movement. But I think it is a mistake to believe that they are invariably on the extreme right. I mean, the major Czech national movements would be in the middle, like Havel, rather than ultra right-wing or they were narodny socialist, like those movements that were eventually headed by Masaryk and Benes. I think initially small-nation liberation movements, which begin in the late nineteenth century, tend to be very much more on the right, partly because the only people who were prepared to support movements of this kind, tended to be conservatives, who were indeed opposed to large-nation nationalism.

That still does not solve the problem why the liberals were not able to hold their grip on nationalism and why especially the socialists were not able to deflect people from becoming right-wing nationalists. At the end of the nineteenth century the biggest national movements definitely were not left-wing.

Which ones are you thinking of?

For example the German nationalist movements.

Oh, by that time it is perfectly clear that the nationalist movement has become right-wing. That starts from the moment that you get democratization and especially the economic troubles in the 1870s and 1880s. There is another thing of course. With the establishment of large national states, there is a political advantage for governments in encouraging hostility to rival states, particularly in the imperialist era. There is also a point which I have tried to make and that is the rise of various kinds of a discontented petty bourgeoisie, which is undoubtedly much more attracted to nationalism. In a sense it is equivalent to class consciousness for them. They dislike both the masses and the capitalists. In so far as these are social strata which were expanding, and which in various countries were quite large, there is then a new basis.

And that sort of nationalism is something of a revolt against modernization?

Yes, although it does not work out. In a sense it is not a feasible program. There is no question about it, that this kind of nationalism is very largely an anti-modernist movement. The situation however becomes more difficult because of the development of politics toward the end of the nineteenth century with the rise of independent movements which are directed against the state and do not accept loyalty to it. In some ways the very growth of democracy, in so far as people can now identify with their state and with their country, makes people patriotic. At least potentially. I mention this to explain why so many of the labour-movements genuinely were enthusiastic about the First World War. It did not seem to them to have anything to do with being against capitalists. Whereas for instance in a case like Italy, where labourers had not become citizens, this was not the case. It is very interesting to see that in Italy the attempts to build a national tradition for the united Italy, arising out of Risorgimento, were a complete failure. Unlike Germany, where you find all these people building up Bismarck columns and singing songs. In Italy when they did this, it simply did not work out. Celebrations for instance of the 25th anniversary of the recovery of Rome as a capital of the united Italy: no success! For most Italians the Risorgimento was not something which had anything to do with them. It was a Piedmontese coming in and in so far as it had a mass basis, it was essentially a middle-class mass basis. The actual electorate of the united Italy was about one and a half percent of the adult population and consequently you do not get an identification of Italians with being Italian. I do not think this actually began to happen before fascism. Fascism was the first movement which made Italians feel Italian. The only other way in which the Italians before 1914 identified with being Italian was probably through being a member of the Italian socialist party. Otherwise the problem 'We have made Italy, now we are to make Italians', had not been solved.

Could one not say that nationalism was very progressive, or at least modern, in its means, but rather reactionary, or at least conservative, in its goals?

It is certainly not conservative the world along. In some ways it is a bit like the sorcerer's apprentice. You create a people and then, once you have created it within its framework, the people start defining themselves in all sorts of ways.

The old conservatives were aware of this.

The old conservatives were aware of this and kept their distance. The people started

to define themselves in all sorts of ways which you could no longer control. Some of which you may find agreeable to you because they are against social revolutionaries, but others are not. Especially if you yourself have to establish your ideology of citizenship by the usual way, by creating the myth of the state, its history, its civilization. Then it does tend to slip out of control.

What exactly is the social background of nationalists in the different phases of nationalism?

I think that varies substantially. The original cultural nationalism was probably carried by people of a higher social background than the later, more militant nationalism. The analysis of that later political nationalism of phase B I think has been excellently done by Hroch. I only want to stress that we are not only talking about social class, but also to some extent about regions within countries. When it comes to the activists, almost certainly the more the nationalist movement advances, the more likely it becomes broadly speaking, a petty bourgeois movement. Except in one or two special cases where there happens to have been an almost pre-national tradition of nationalism, such as among the Polish gentry, which by the way was quite a large class. The Polish and Hungarian gentry were something like 10% of the population. In these instances groups which are not petty bourgeois were considerably more important. That was not the case with the Croatian nationalism. I do not believe there was a similarly large body of Croatian gentry. Normally everything was much more in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie and especially of the first generation of the vernacular-educated. You can say with some confidence that workers, peasants, servants and women in general were probably least likely, the latest if you like, to be affected. Beyond this I think one really would have to look at the social base case by case. The problem is of course complicated by the fact that the definition in any given country of what constitutes for example the middle class or the lower middle class may not always be the same.

When you say it was a petty bourgeois movement, you imply it never became a 'popular' movement?

Well of course that depends on what you mean by 'popular'. You have to distinguish between the movement which eventually won independence and the situation afterwards. It could be won at a time when the masses were not politically involved at all. How popular these movements were, is hard to say. The only test I think we actually have, is the election for the Constituent Assembly in Russia in 1917. As far as we can see the nationalist parties and movements as such, and

certainly the separatist ones, were not particularly important at that time, except in the Ukraine. There you can actually test the importance of nationalist issues, because there people had the choice between voting for a party called the Social Revolutionaries and a party called the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries. These parties were very similar, except in their name. More people voted for the Ukrainian Revolutionaries. That makes it quite clear that adding 'Ukrainian' to your name had a positive effect. Nevertheless there were quite a large number of areas where nationalism was comparatively unimportant, for instance the zone of Lithuania that was occupied by the Germans. But curiously enough in Estonia, Latvia and Bielorussia the nationalist vote was far behind the pro-Bolshevist vote at that time. Of course Georgia and Armenia in the Caucasus were also very largely nationalist, but not pure nationalist. What one sees there is people voting for a combination of national and social liberation. In Ireland, when democratic vote was available, practically everybody, every Catholic constituency, voted for an Irish national MP. But even a number of these MPs only slowly learned to call themselves nationalists in the course of the period between 1870 and 1914. People broadly speaking voted against the English and the Protestants, but to what extent they actually sympathized with the militants of the national party in a particular area is not so clear.

Was it in the interest of common people to become nationalist?

I think it was in their interest if they felt they could combine nationalism with social interests which very much concerned them. It was for instance much easier for peasants to become 'nationalist' if their landlords, shopkeepers or moneylenders belonged to an other nationality. In such a case, where his enemies are Jewish or Hungarian, it is much easier for a Slovak peasant to say: 'I am Slovak'. In Ireland, the most Irish and Gaelic part, the most depressed part, actually did not get in and become active on the nationalist side until the rise of the Land League. The peasant could understand the Land League which wanted an agrarian reform. This does not mean he was pro-English before! But what actually got him mobilized was when the cause of the Irish and the cause of the peasant-holder somehow appeared to have a direct connection. Of course it is possible in many cases to get a mass-base in a time of foreign occupation or war. There is no reason to suppose that that is class-determined.

Earlier on you referred to 'creating the myth of the state'. Could you tell us what in general was the role of historians in this process of nation-building?

Well, obviously it was an enormous role. The tradition, what eventually is taught in schools, is very largely what schoolteachers get out of the work of historians. Historians have got two possible functions, an early and a later one. Earlier on very largely they do in fact spend their time establishing the national tradition and merely establishing the nation's history, which is, if you like, establishing a national tradition.

Is that equivalent to 'inventing' a tradition?¹⁰

Well, in doing so, you are indeed to some extent inventing it, because in fact you are putting together things which do not necessarily belong together. Having done that, of course, that tradition is used, not necessarily in the way in which the historians wanted it to use, but nevertheless, it becomes part of the basic material of education, for example in text-books used in schools. There is much original historical tradition which has been turned into mythology. You could not do this anymore in the nineteenth century, in the second phase, because scholarship had gone too far. But in the eighteenth century you could still do it. Originally, as far as the nation is concerned, the past is not really important for what it is. It is important simply because it actually represents what you want your nation to be. In some instances you just invent it. You could forge crucial documents like Ossian's poems and the Czech Manuscripts, or you could even invent a druid tradition for the Welsh, which everybody knew was a pure invention.¹¹ But even if later on somebody came along like president Masaryk at the end of the nineteenth century and proved that the Czech Manuscripts were indeed forgeries, this created considerable political resistance because many people were not interested in their truth, they were interested in their significance for national glory. You can see a very good example of the extent to which nationalism can actually pay not the slightest attention to history in black history as it is sometimes practised in the United States. There are attempts to 'prove', simply because it is regarded as essential to prove it, that American blacks have had a more glorious history than has been known until now. Therefore one actually invents a history which, if you can control educational establishments, is then taught in schools.

Could you say a few words on the future of nationalism?

I think it has no real future. Of course there are many nationalist movements. Nationalist ideas are not dead, far from it. It would be silly to say so. I am afraid they can still cause a lot of trouble. But I do not think nationalism is a viable option in the sense that I do not believe the new, smaller nations the nationalists want to

create, can have much of an independent future. The future belongs to bigger entities.

Noten

1. Voor de meest recente uiteenzetting van Smiths ideeën zie: A.D. Smith, *National identity* (Harmondsworth 1991).
2. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge 1990) 46.
3. G.A. Williams, 'When was Wales?' in: E.J. Hobsbawm, ed., *The Welsh in their history* (Londen en Canberra 1982).
4. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, 10.
5. De Tsjechische historicus Hroch onderscheidt in zijn werk een drietal fasen in de geschiedenis van het (negentiende-eeuwse, Europese) nationalisme. In de eerste fase (fase A) is het 'nationalisme' nog volledig een culturele, literaire en folkloristische aangelegenheid, gedragen door intellectuelen en zonder enige politieke lading. In de tweede fase (fase B) krijgt het veel meer een politieke strekking en is er duidelijk sprake van nationalistische activisten die politieke doeleinden willen verwezenlijken. De derde fase (fase C) is aangebroken wanneer het nationalisme een massa-beweging is geworden. Voor een recente samenvatting van Hrochs ideeën zie: M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe* (Cambridge 1985).
6. E. Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Oxford 1983) 1.
7. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, 10-11.
8. Zie het interview met Tilly in dit nummer, 9 e.v..
9. Hobsbawm verwijst hier naar S. Pollard, *Peaceful conquest: the industrialization of Europe 1760-1970* (Oxford 1981).
10. Voor de betekenis van de uitdrukking 'the invention of tradition' zie: E.J. Hobsbawm en T. Ranger, ed., *The invention of tradition* (Cambridge 1983).
11. Voor een nadere toelichting op de 'Czech Manuscripts' zie het artikel van Mout in dit nummer, 105 e.v..